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Smallwood: R.I.P. Employer Intentional Torts

R.I.P. EMPLOYER INTENTIONAL TORTS: THE DEBILITATING
APPLICATION OF OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION 2745.01
Brice Smallwood *

I. INTRODUCTION
Ohio’s workers’ compensation fund emerged as a compromise that
guaranteed compensation for employees’ workplace injuries while
employers escaped unlimited liability. 1 However, this left open the
question of whether employees could still sue for actions that went
beyond mere negligence. 2 For three decades, the Ohio General
Assembly and Supreme Court of Ohio warred over what constituted an
employer intentional tort. The General Assembly attempted several
times to restrict the cause of action and shield employers from liability. 3
The Supreme Court of Ohio firmly stood by its principle that workers’
compensation would not be the sole remedy for intentional torts
committed by an employer. Rather, an injured employee could recover
both workers’ compensation and damages. 4
In 2010, however, the court suddenly shifted from its position when
determining the constitutionality of section 2745.01 of the Ohio Revised
Code, which severely restricts employees’ potential causes of action.5
Section 2745.01 provided the typical two prongs for an intentional tort
as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 6 An employee can
recover if the employer acts with the intent to injure or if the employer is
substantially certain that an injury will result from their conduct. 7
Unfortunately, though, the General Assembly defined substantial
certainty as “acting with the deliberate intent” to injure. 8 Therefore,
what was once two avenues for recovery became only one. 9
When the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the constitutionality of
section 2745.01, some felt that this completely eliminated the possibility

* Associate Member, 2015-2016 University of Cincinnati Law Review. A special thanks to
Professor Marianna Bettman for the topic idea and all of the help along the way.
1. See 1 PHILIP J. FULTON, OHIO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.2 (Matthew Bender rev.
ed. 2014).
2. See BRADD N. SIEGEL & JOHN M. STEPHEN, OHIO EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LAW § 15:17
(2014). Previously, employees could only sue for negligent acts committed by their employer. Id.
3. See id.
4. See generally Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991).
5. See Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prod. Co., 927 N.E.2d 1066 (Ohio 2010).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
7. Id.
8. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (LexisNexis 2016).
9. Id.
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of an employee recovering for an intentional tort. 10 When looking at the
case law that has developed since the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision,
those initial forecasts of extinction were indeed correct. 11 The court has
interpreted and applied section 2745.01 so strictly that one would be
foolish to even think that the employer intentional tort is on life
support—it is dead.
This casenote outlines the history of the employer intentional tort in
Ohio and concludes that section 2745.01 effectively destroys the tort.
Part II of this article provides the background of the Ohio’s workers’
compensation fund and the long battle between the General Assembly
and Supreme Court of Ohio over whether workers’ compensation should
be an exclusive remedy. Parts III and IV discuss the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s strict interpretation and application of Section 2745.01 (B) and
(C). Finally, Part V concludes that the enactment and the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s interpretation of Section 2745.01 have effectively
eliminated the possibility of employees recovering for an employer
intentional tort.
II. BACKGROUND OF OHIO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYER
INTENTIONAL TORTS
The Workers’ Compensation Act left questions as to whether
workers’ compensation would be the exclusive remedy for workplace
injuries. Initially, courts held that workers’ compensation was the sole
remedy, but this interpretation slowly eroded and eventually the
Supreme Court of Ohio held that intentional torts fell outside the realm
of workers’ compensation. 12 A three-decade war emerged as the
General Assembly attempted to restrict recovery for employer
intentional torts. The Supreme Court of Ohio stood by its decision that
workers’ compensation was not the sole remedy until the Kaminski v.
Metal & Wire Products Co. decision in 2010, which held that section
2745.01 was constitutional. 13
A. Ohio Workers’ Compensation
Ohio established a voluntary workers’ compensation fund in 1911 by

10. See generally Aamir Mahboob, Comment, The Judicial-Legislative War: Employer
Intentional Torts in Ohio, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 525 (2004).
11. See generally Bran D. Kerns & Marc A. Glumac, Finding Some Certainty in the
Substantially Uncertain Realm of Employer Intentional Tort: The History of Compensation Workers in
Ohio, OHIO ASS’N OF CIV. TRIAL ATT’YS, Summer 2013, at 3, 4.
12. See SIEGEL & STEPHEN, supra note 2.
13. See Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prod. Co., 927 N.E.2d 1066 (Ohio 2010).
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enacting section 4123.35 of the Ohio Revised Code, with the 1912
General Assembly mandating payments from employers. 14 Prior to this
enactment, employees relied on the common law to recover for their
workplace injuries. 15 However, the common law system proved to be
incapable of providing adequate protection for injuries that were
inevitable because of the dangers prevalent in modern industrialism. 16
In the previous system, the employee had the burden of proving that the
employer was actually at fault, but this was virtually impossible with all
of the defenses employers had in their arsenal. 17 Typically, the
workplace injury resulted from the inherent risk of employment in
which no one was at fault, so employers effortlessly escaped liability. 18
The Ohio workers’ compensation fund established an enduring
compromise between employees and employers. 19 Employers now bear
the burden of workplace injuries, not society as a whole. 20 In order to
recover damages, employees no longer have to prove the employer was
at fault, which gives employees broad coverage for any injury that
occurs in the workplace. 21 With this broad coverage also comes
sacrifice: employees relinquish their common law right to bring a civil
suit against their employer. 22 Employers also make sacrifices by giving
up all of their common law defenses in exchange for protection against
open-ended liability. 23
Article II, section 35 of the Ohio Constitution established the
“insurance fund,” which provides benefits for those workers who are
injured during the course of employment. 24 Employers pay annual
premiums at a basic rate into the state fund; depending on their
experience rating, additional payments may be required. 25 The
experience rating system is an incentive designed to promote safety
practices. 26 If the employer has a bad loss experience, they are
penalized and have to pay in excess of the basic premium rate. 27
14. See FULTON, supra note 1, § 2.11.
15. Id. § 1.1.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 1.2. Assumption of the risk and contributory negligence were the most effective
defenses for employers. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION § 1.01 (Matthew Bender rev.
ed. 2016).
21. See FULTON, supra note 1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. FULTON, supra note 1, § 14.1.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 14.7.
27. Id. A bad loss experience is when the employer has suffered multiple workplace injuries in
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Even though making the person whole again is the primary goal of a
tort claim, workers’ compensation often fails to make the employee
whole. 28 Within this tradeoff, employees effectively relinquish the
ability to seek full redress in exchange for the certainty that they will
always be compensated. 29
B. The Erosion of Workers’ Compensation as the Exclusive Remedy for
Workplace Injuries
For nearly a half-century, Ohio courts viewed the workers’
compensation fund as the exclusive remedy for all workplace injuries.
In Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., an employee brought an intentional tort
suit against the employer for concealing an X-ray that revealed an
occupational injury. 30 However, the court held that the Workers’
Compensation Act effectively eliminated unlimited liability for
employers, and therefore, the employee’s only recourse was workers’
compensation, regardless of intent. 31
This exclusivity interpretation began to erode slowly in 1959 when
the General Assembly enacted section 4123.74 of the Ohio Revised
Code which states, “Employers who comply with section 4123.35 of the
Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law
or by statute for any injury, or occupational disease, or bodily condition,
received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of
his employment.” 32 Following the enactment of section 4123.74, a 1978
Sixth District case, Delamotte v. Unitcast Division of Midland Ross
Corp., demonstrated the erosion of the exclusivity interpretation. 33
Despite almost identical facts to Bevis, the court held that the 1959
amendment allows employees to sue employers for intentional torts,
because an intentional tort does not “arise out of employment” under the
amendment. 34
The issue of whether section 4123.35 of the Ohio Revised Code was
intended to cover intentional torts committed by employers was

the past. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Overall, the Workers’ Compensation Act benefitted both employers and employees
because employees were compensated for any injuries sustained while at work and employers no longer
faced unlimited liability. Id.
30. See Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 93 N.E.2d 33, 34 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
31. See id. at 35.
32. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (LexisNexis 2016) (emphasis added).
33. See Delamotte v. Unitcast Div. of Midland Ross Corp., 411 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ohio Ct. App.
1978).
34. Id. at 816. This decision planted the seed for the Supreme Court of Ohio to attack the
exclusivity of the workers’ compensation system.
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discussed in a 1982 case, Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron
Chemicals, Inc. 35 In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio
followed in the Sixth District’s footsteps and held that intentional torts
committed by an employer fall outside the realm of employment for
purposes of workers’ compensation. 36 The plaintiffs in Blankenship
were employees of a chemical company who were exposed to fumes and
other “noxious characteristics of certain chemicals.” 37 The employer
knew of these conditions and did nothing to prevent employees from
exposure. 38 The employer’s defense relied on the longstanding
commitment to workers’ compensation being the exclusive remedy for
all workplace injuries. 39 The court ruled to the contrary; stating that
workers’ compensation does not provide immunity from civil liability
for intentional torts. 40 The court noted that the purpose of the Workers’
Compensation Act was to promote a safe and injury-free work
However, allowing blanket liability for injuries
environment. 41
sustained at work, including intentional torts, would not promote the
goal of the act. 42 The court further held that granting immunity for
intentional torts actually encouraged employers to engage in such
egregious conduct; therefore, the Workers’ Compensation Act did not
preclude the employee from filing an intentional tort suit. 43
Two years after the Blankenship decision, the court addressed the
standard for proving an intentional tort against an employer in Jones v.
VIP Development Co. 44 The court held that intent is much broader than
a desire to bring about physical results, rather, intent also extends to
those results that the employer believes are substantially certain to
occur. 45 This decision established that acts lacking a specific intent to
injure could still constitute an intentional tort and, as a result, were
beyond the scope of workers’ compensation coverage. 46 Relying on
Prosser and Keaton, specialists in the area of torts, the court determined
that the standard for an intentional tort is “an act committed with the

35. Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems. Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982).
36. See id.
37. Id. at syllabus.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 614.
40. See id.
41. Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 614.
42. See id.
43. See id. For the first time since the Workers’ Compensation Act was enacted the Supreme
Court of Ohio allowed an employee to bring a civil suit against an employer who committed an
egregious act such as an intentional tort.
44. See Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984).
45. See id. at 94–95.
46. See id.
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intent to injure another, or committed with the belief that such injury is
substantially certain to occur.” 47 The court then further analyzed the
“substantial certainty” standard, distinguishing acts with a substantially
certain outcome from negligent acts. 48 To recover for an employer
intentional tort, the employee must prove that the employer intended to
harm or that the employer was substantially certain that an injury would
occur; anything less will be mere negligence and workers’ compensation
will be the exclusive remedy. 49
C. The General Assembly Limits Employer Intentional Torts: Section
4121.80 of the Ohio Revised Code
In response to the rulings in Blankenship and Jones, in 1988 the
General Assembly attempted to soften the blow on employers by
enacting section 4121.80. 50 The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled on the
constitutionality of this statute in Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. 51 The
court criticized the statute in regard to subsection (G) of section
4121.80, which states:
As used in this section: Intentional tort is an act committed with
the intent to injure another or committed with the belief that the
injury is substantially certain to occur. Deliberate removal by the
employer of an equipment safety guard or deliberate
misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance is evidence,
the presumption of which may be rebutted, of an action committed
with the intent to injure another if the injury or an occupational
disease or condition occurs as a direct result. Substantially certain
means that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an
employee to suffer injury, disease, condition, or death. 52
The court struck down section 4121.80 as unconstitutional because the
General Assembly attempted to remove a right to a remedy. 53
According to the court, this was contrary to article II, section 34 of the
Ohio Constitution which states, “Laws may be passed fixing and
regulating the hours of labor, establishing a minimum wage, and
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 95.
Id.
See id.
See SIEGEL & STEPHEN, supra note 2.
Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991).
Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 724 n.1.
See Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 728.
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providing for the comfort, health, safety and general welfare of all
employees.” 54 Therefore, one could not interpret a statute that removes
a right to a remedy to further the comfort, health, safety, and general
welfare of all employees. 55 Additionally, the court followed the
Blankenship line of reasoning by holding that the legislature cannot
enact legislation governing employer intentional torts because this
intentional conduct will always take place outside of the employer–
employee relationship. 56 The court stood by its established principle:
when an employer commits an intentional tort, the employer–employee
relationship is abolished and replaced by the intentional-tortfeasor–
victim relationship. 57
D. The General Assembly Limits Employer Intentional Torts Take Two:
Section 2745.01 of the Ohio Revised Code
Not to be discouraged by the Brady decision, in 1995 the General
Assembly enacted section 2745.01 of the Ohio Revised Code. 58 Once
again, this was an attempt to restrict employees’ ability to recover for
intentional torts committed by an employer. 59 In Johnson v. BP
Chemicals, Inc., the Supreme Court of Ohio did not hold back its
disapproval of the General Assembly’s second attempt to cloak
employers with blanket immunity for injuries sustained by employees. 60
The court noted, in the very beginning of the opinion, “We can only
assume that the General Assembly has either failed to grasp the import
of our holdings in Brady or that the General Assembly has simply
elected to willfully disregard that decision.” 61 The relevant provisions
of the statute that the court addressed provided:
(c)(1) If the defendant employer moves for summary judgment, the
court shall enter judgment for the defendant unless the plaintiff
employee or dependent survivors set forth specific facts supported
by clear and convincing evidence to establish that the employer
committed an employment intentional tort against the employee.
54. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 34 (1851).
55. Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 728.
56. See id. at 729.
57. Id. Section 4121.80(G) also presented issues concerning the constitutionality of the statute
because it granted the Industrial Commission original jurisdiction to determine the amount of damages.
Id. The court held that the Industrial Commission does not have original jurisdiction because an
intentional tort does not arise out of the employment relationship. Id.
58. SIEGEL & STEPHEN, supra note 2.
59. Johnson v. BP Chem. Inc., 707 N.E.2d 1107 (Ohio 1999).
60. See Johnson, 707 N.E.2d 1107.
61. Id.
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....
(d)(1) ‘Employment intentional tort’ means an act committed by
an employer in which the employer deliberately and intentionally
injures, causes an occupational disease of, or causes the death of
an employee. 62
The court held that, much like section 4121.80, this latest attempt by the
General Assembly to restrict employer intentional torts did not
withstand constitutional muster. 63
Requiring that the employee
demonstrate by “clear and convincing” evidence that the employer acted
with the deliberate intent to injure would be almost impossible to
prove. 64 Moreover, the court discussed how the General Assembly
actually created an illusory cause of action because section 2745.01 did
not provide any protections to employees. 65 In order to recover under
section 2745.01, the injured employee essentially had to prove that the
employer committed criminal assault. 66
In short, the court vigorously defended the position it had firmly
maintained for nearly two decades: employers cannot be cloaked from
liability for intentional torts. 67 The requirements imposed by the
General Assembly under section 2745.01 were so unreasonable that
employees faced an insurmountable hurdle, and their likelihood of
recovering was virtually nonexistent. 68 As in Brady, the court held that
these excessive standards for recovery in no way furthered the comfort,
health, safety, and general welfare of all employees as required by
article II, section 34 of the Ohio Constitution. 69
E. The General Assembly Limits Employer Intentional Torts Take Three:
Current Section 2745.01
After the tongue lashing from the Johnson court, the General
Assembly waited until 2005 to make its third attempt at limiting
employees’ ability to recover for an employer intentional tort. Section
2745.01 currently states:
(A) In an action brought against an employer by an employee,
62. Johnson v. BP Chem. Inc., 707 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 n.2 (Ohio 1999).
63. Johnson, 707 N.E.2d at 1112.
64. Id. at 1113.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991); Blankenship v. Cincinnati
Milacron Chems. Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982).
68. Johnson, 707 N.E.2d at 1114.
69. Id.
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or by the dependent survivors of a deceased employee, for
damages resulting from an intentional tort committed by the
employer during the course of employment, the employer shall not
be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed
the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief
that the injury was substantially certain to occur. (B) As used in
this section, “substantially certain” means that an employer acts
with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a
disease, a condition or death. (C) Deliberate removal by an
employer of an equipment safety guard or deliberate
misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance creates a
rebuttable presumption that the removal or misrepresentation was
committed with intent to injure another if an injury or an
occupational disease or condition occurs as a direct result. 70
The newest attempt to limit employers’ liability was examined in
Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Products Co. and its companion case Stetter
v. RJ Corman Derailment Services.71
Based on the court’s
unwillingness to accede to the General Assembly’s previous efforts to
restrict employer intentional torts, it seemed it would be a clear-cut
decision.
However, with the new additions of Justices Cupp,
O’Donnell, O’Connor, and Lanzinger, the court upheld the
constitutionality of section 2745.01. 72
The court in Kaminski held that sections 34 and 35 of article II
actually affirmatively grant the General Assembly authority enact
legislation. 73 The court reasoned that to read these sections as a
limitation on the General Assembly’s authority would result in a
prohibition of all legislation that imposed any burden on employees,
regardless of how beneficial it may be to the public. 74 The court
criticized the Brady and Johnson decisions for striking down statutes
because those courts read into article II, section 34 that “no law shall be
passed unless” it furthers the comfort, health, safety, and general
welfare. However, the court found that this language was not included
in that section of the Ohio Constitution, and thus, should be read as a
grant of authority as opposed to a limitation. 75 The court also held that

70. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (LexisNexis 2016).
71. See 1 MAYNARD G. SAUTTER, EMPLOYMENT IN OHIO, § 1-5 (Matthew Bender 2016).
72. See generally Richard M. Garner, Flexible Predictability: Stare Decisis in Ohio, 48 AKRON
L. REV. 15 (2015).
73. See Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prod. Co., 927 N.E.2d 1066, 1081 (Ohio 2010).
74. Id.
75. Id. This shift in interpretation of article II, section 34 was critical to upholding the statute
because it was the backbone of the holdings in Brady and Johnson. See also SAUTTER, supra note 71.
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section 2745.01 was substantially different from the older versions.76
This distinction was imperative to holding the statute constitutional
because it eliminated the blanket application of the Johnson and Brady
decisions. 77 Since the General Assembly did not merely reenact the
same statute, the precedential value of previous cases could be
avoided. 78
In his dissent, Justice Pfeifer noted several times that this case was
merely “déjà vu” because this was the third time that the General
Assembly attempted to restrict employer intentional torts. 79 In Johnson,
the court held that even though the older version of section 2745.01 was
different from section 4121.80, the purposes of those statutes were the
same. 80 For Justice Pfeifer, the fact that section 2745.01 was different
from the former version was irrelevant because the substance of the
statute should be examined and both statutes attempted to cloak
employers from liability for intentional torts. 81 The Johnson court held
that since the employee had to show the employer’s conduct was
deliberate and intentional, the cause of action was illusory and this is
exactly what the current section 2745.01 requires. 82 Justice Pfeifer
ended his dissent with a recap of the battle between the court and
General Assembly when he stated, “But today, the cycle ends, as the
General Assembly has found a court that agrees with it: workers have no
constitutionally protected right to seek redress for injuries suffered from
their employer’s intentional torts.” 83
The Stetter decision mirrored Kaminski in the legal analysis and the
court held that section 2745.01 is constitutional. 84 Notably, the court
analyzed the General Assembly’s reasoning for enacting section
2745.01. 85 The General Assembly’s intent was to curtail the substantial
certainty provision of employer intentional torts. 86 Now, recovery is
76. Kaminski, 927 N.E.2d at 1087. The court focused on the 1995 version of section 2745.01
and section 4120.80. Id. Specifically, the court noted how the older provision’s burdens were too
onerous. Id. The statute made recovery for an intentional tort too difficult, rendering the cause of action
“illusory” and not constitutionally valid. Id.
77. Id. at 1087–88.
78. See id. Additionally, the court noted that this statute does not abolish the cause of action for
intentional torts but merely constrains employees’ ability to recover to only intentional acts and that
such a constraint is within the General Assembly’s authority.
79. Kaminski, 927 N.E.2d at 1091 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id. The majority opinion ignored years of precedent in order to finally give in to the General
Assembly’s wish to extinguish workplace intentional torts.
84. Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., 927 N.E.2d 1092, 1097 (Ohio 2010).
85. See id. at 1099–1100.
86. Id. at 1100.
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only permissible when the employer acted with the specific intent to
cause an injury. 87 The court went even further than it did in Kaminski to
distinguish section 2745.01 from its predecessors in order to avoid
applying stare decisis. 88 The court commended the General Assembly
for tailoring the legislation to cure the constitutional defects of the past
statutes. 89 This tailoring of the current section 2745.01 made it
sufficiently different in the eyes of the majority to avoid stare decisis.90
Specifically, the General Assembly eliminated the “clear and
convincing” standard of proof that Johnson previously invalidated.91
The court held that the General Assembly eliminated many of the
unreasonable, onerous, and excessive provisions of the statute, thereby
making it distinguishable from the statutes that the court previously held
as unconstitutional. 92
Once again, Justice Pfeifer dissented for many of the same reasons he
did in Kaminski. In this dissent, he noted that section 2745.01 restricts
employees’ right to a remedy. 93 The General Assembly did not merely
restrict employer intentional torts, instead the General Assembly
effectively eliminated them. 94 Similar to the Johnson and Brady courts,
Pfeifer noted that the requirement of deliberate intent is such a high
burden that the act would have to constitute a criminal act to prevail.95
Despite the changes the General Assembly made to current section
2745.01, Pfeifer argued that the statute is the same as the previous
versions and simply includes cosmetic differences. 96 Pfeifer concluded
that the statute still eliminates a remedy for employees injured by the
egregious acts of employers, which is precisely what the court found to
be unconstitutional in Brady and Johnson. 97
III. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 2745.01(B)
This part will discuss section 2745.01(B) and the Supreme Court of

87. Id.
88. Stare decisis is the legal principle of determining cases based on precedent. Stare Decisis,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
89. See Stetter, 927 N.E.2d at 1102.
90. See id.
91. See SAUTTER, supra note 71. Additionally, the new legislation is distinguishable from
section 4121.80 because it does not restrict recovery to an amount in excess of workers’ compensation
benefits and a court determines the amount of damages as opposed to the Industrial Commission. Id.
92. Stetter, 927 N.E.2d at 1103.
93. Id. at 1111 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1112.
97. See id.
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Ohio’s strict interpretation. Section 2745.01(B) has been the provision
used most often by employees to file suit against their employer for an
intentional tort. Subsection (B) eliminates recovery for the “substantial
certainty” prong of the Restatement Second intentional tort by defining
substantial certainty as an act by the employer with the deliberate intent
to cause an employee to suffer injury. 98 The workers’ compensation
fund established a compromise between employees and employers, but,
as the cases show, eliminating the possibility of recovering when an
employer is substantially certain that its conduct will cause an injury
loads the dice too heavily in favor of the employer. Employees
attempted to circumvent subsection (B) by using Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) violations to infer that under all of
the circumstances of the injury, the employer acted with the intent to
harm. 99 However, courts rejected this because it only established that
the employer was aware that an injury was likely to occur, but not that
the employer actually intended to injure the employee. 100 Two options
exist to overcome this problem. First, and most preferable, the General
Assembly should reenact the substantial certainty prong because it
requires employers to facilitate a safe workplace. Second, if the
substantial certainty prong is eliminated, then employees should be able
to present evidence like OSHA violations, which will allow courts to use
a “totality of the circumstances” approach to infer that the employer
acted with intent to injure.
A. Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A. 101
Bruce Houdek injured his back while working for ThyssenKrupp and
returned to work shortly thereafter. 102 Upon Houdek’s return, his
supervisor, Joseph Matras, assigned him to relabeling inventory on the
warehouse storage racks. 103 Other employees in the warehouse drove
sideloaders, machines similar to forklifts, to remove goods from the
racks that Houdek relabeled. 104 At an employee meeting concerning the
relabeling process, George Krajacic, a sideloader operator, asked Matras
if he should rearrange his schedule to avoid pulling goods from aisles in
which employees like Houdek would be relabeling. 105 Matras said that
98. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (LexisNexis 2016).
99. See generally Harris v. Benjamin Steel Co., 2015-Ohio-1499 (Ct. App. 2015); Vermett v.
Fred Christen and Sons Co., 741 N.E.2d 954 (Ohio App. 2000).
100. See generally Harris v. Benjamin Steel Co., 2015-Ohio-1499 (Ct. App. 2015).
101. Houdek v. Thyssenkrupp Materials N.A., 983 N.E.2d 1253 (Ohio 2012).
102. Id. at 1254.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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this would not be necessary. 106 On the day of the injury, Houdek
informed Krajacic that he would be working in a specific aisle.107
However, after several hours, Krajacic forgot about Houdek and drove
the sideloader down the dead-end aisle that Houdek occupied.108
Houdek shattered his leg and ankle when the sideloader pinned him
against a scissor lift he had been using. 109 Houdek sued, alleging that
Matras directed him to work in the aisle with knowledge that injury
would be substantially certain to occur. 110
1. Eighth District Decision
The trial court granted ThyssenKrupp’s motion for summary
judgment and Houdek appealed to the Eighth District. 111 The Eighth
District discussed how section 2745.01(A) and (B) could not be
harmonized because they conflicted. 112 The court held that subsection
(B) was a scrivener’s error because intent to injure and deliberate intent
to injure are essentially the same concept so to include this twice does
not make sense. 113 Furthermore, instead of applying a subjective
standard when analyzing subsection (B), the Eighth District held that
courts should interpret the employer’s belief objectively. 114 Under
subsection (B), the employer’s belief must be viewed in light of what a
reasonably prudent employer would believe. 115 To read subsection (B)
any other way permits willful ignorance or deceit on the part of the
employer. 116 The Eight District held that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether a reasonable prudent employer would believe that
an injury was substantially certain to occur when directing Houdek to

106. Id.
107. Houdek, 983 N.E.2d at 1255.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. ERNST, OHIO TORT LAW § 42:110 (2015).
112. Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., 2011-Ohio-1694, ¶ 42 (Ct. App. 2011); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (LexisNexis 2016) (“(A) In an action brought against an employer by an
employee, or by the dependent survivors of a deceased employee, for damages resulting from an
intentional tort committed by the employer during the course of employment, the employer shall not be
liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed the tortious act with the intent to injure
another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur. (B) As used in this section,
‘substantially certain’ means that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer
an injury, a disease, a condition, or death.”).
113. Houdek, 2011-Ohio-1694, ¶ 42. A scrivener’s error is a drafting or typographical error that
was not fixed after the initial drafting. Scrivener's Error, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
114. Id. ¶ 45.
115. Id. ¶ 45.
116. Id. ¶ 45.
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relabel in the same aisle as sideloaders. 117
2. Supreme Court of Ohio Decision
The Supreme Court of Ohio, referencing Kaminski and Stetter, noted
that the General Assembly’s purpose for enacting section 2745.01was to
significantly curtail the “substantial certainty” employer intentional
tort. 118 Therefore, subsection (B) was not a scrivener’s error; instead, it
was the General Assembly’s careful drafting to limit recovery to only
those cases in which the employer acted with the specific intent to
injure.119 Without the deliberate intent to injure, which subsection (B)
explicitly requires, the employer will not be liable for an intentional tort
and the exclusive remedy is workers’ compensation. 120 The court held
that Houdek presented no evidence showing ThyssenKrupp acted with
the deliberate intent to injure. 121 Instead, Houdek’s injuries were the
result of a “tragic accident” that may have been avoided had certain
precautions been taken, but the statute requires more than a showing that
an employer knowingly placed an employee at risk. 122
3. Justice Pfeifer’s Dissent
Justice Pfeifer, in his dissent, argued that courts can infer intent to
injure from the facts and circumstances of the case. 123 Justice Pfeifer
held that if courts cannot infer intent to injure, workers must rely solely
on employers confessing that the they acted with the deliberate intent to
injure. 124 In this case, Justice Pfeifer found that the intent to injure
could be inferred from the facts. 125 Houdek was already injured when
Matras directed him to work in a dimly lit, narrow, and dead-end aisle
where an encounter with a sideloader was likely. 126 According to
Justice Pfeifer, a reasonable jury could infer that ThyssenKrupp
intended to injure Houdek based on these facts. 127 Under the standard

117. Id. ¶ 46. This decision mirrored the Jones standard that an employee can recover by showing
that either the employer acted with intent to injure or the employer was substantially certain that an
injury would occur.
118. Houdek v. Thyssenkrupp Materials N.A., 983 N.E.2d 1253, 1258 (Ohio 2012).
119. See ERNST, supra note 111.
120. See Houdek, 983 N.E.2d at 1258.
121. Id. at 1259.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 1260 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. See Houdek, 983 N.E.2d at 1260.
126. Id.
127. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol85/iss1/7

14

Smallwood: R.I.P. Employer Intentional Torts

2017]

R.I.P. EMPLOYER INTENTIONAL TORTS

265

adopted by the court, workers’ compensation will be the sole remedy
when the employer knowingly places an employee in a dangerous
situation. 128 Justice Pfeifer argued that this is unsound policy because it
places the burden of this inappropriate conduct on all of Ohio’s
employers whether or not they emphasize a safe work environment.129
All employers are required to pay into the workers’ compensation fund,
therefore all employers, whether or not they are responsible for the
injury, pay the compensation allotted when a single employer’s
intentional actions injure an employee. 130
B. Lower Court’s Unwillingness to Apply the Supreme Court’s Decision
As the Eighth District opinion indicates, lower courts often have a
hard time applying section 2745.01. Even more alarming, however, is
that lower courts have regrettably applied the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
standard as seen in Cain v. Field Local School District. 131 Cain was
employed at a school as a non-teaching assistant where she worked with
learning-disabled children. 132 She had an excellent employment record,
but in her role as a union representative, Cain filed a grievance against a
teacher. 133 Because of this action, Cain alleged that her employer
eliminated her position and subsequently required her to work with
children who had multiple handicaps and disabilities, despite having no
experience working with students with multiple handicaps or
disabilities. 134 The children she was forced to work with were violent
and aggressive, and two students assaulted Cain. 135 Cain suffered
severe injuries from the attack and sued the school district. 136
The court noted that the case was a “difficult one,” because, as Justice
Pfeiffer observed in Houdek, the employer must confess that they acted
with the intent to injure. 137 The court held that despite the difficulty in
prevailing on an employer intentional tort claim, the Supreme Court of
Ohio had made clear that section 2745.01 is a strict standard that courts
must observe. 138 This case displays the hesitancy of lower courts in
applying section 2745.01(B), but ultimately their hands are tied.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 1261.
See id.
See Houdek, 983 N.E.2d at 1261.
See Cain v. Field Local Sch. Dist., 2013-Ohio-1492 (Ct. App. 2013).
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id
Cain v. Field Local Sch. Dist., 2013-Ohio-1492, ¶ 2 (Ct. App. 2013).
Id. ¶ 21.
Id.
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C. Using OSHA Violations to Show Deliberate Intent to Injure
While the Houdek court effectively eliminated any hope of
resurrecting the substantial certainty standard, employees attempted to
circumvent section 2745.01(B) by using OSHA violations to display
deliberate intent to injure. 139 In Head v. Reilly Painting & Contracting,
William Head died from injuries sustained while working for Reilly
Painting. 140 Head was preparing to install new shingles on a flattop roof
of a residential building. 141 The roof was eleven feet off the ground and
Head attempted to hand a broom to a coworker standing on the
ground. 142 Head lost his balance and fell to the ground, leaving him
paralyzed. 143 Head later died from complications resulting from his
injuries. 144 Safety harnesses were available for employees to use at the
scene but Head’s supervisor did not believe they were necessary because
the roof was flat. 145 OSHA required that employees wear harnesses for
all work performed more than six feet off the ground. 146 Subsequently,
OSHA cited Reilly Painting for violating this regulation. 147 Head’s
estate brought an intentional tort action against Reilly Painting on the
ground that the supervisor failed to provide Head with a safety harness
in violation of OSHA regulations. 148 The estate argued that since the
supervisor did not require Head to use a safety harness, reasonable
minds could find that the supervisor acted with the deliberate intent to
injure. 149
Head’s estate asserted that the court should follow a Ninth District
case, decided after the enactment of section 2745.01, in which the court
held that an employer who disregarded OSHA safety regulations was
substantially certain that an injury would occur. 150 However, the Eighth
District rejected this proposal on the grounds that the Ninth District
holding created a fallacy that equated deliberate denial of safety
equipment with deliberate intent to injure. 151 The Eighth District drew a
bright line rule that OSHA violations alone are insufficient to satisfy

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 21:5 (2016).
Head v. Reilly Painting & Contracting Inc., 28 N.E.3d 126, 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Head, 28 N.E.3d at 129.
Id.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 129; see also Smith v. Ray Esser & Sons Inc., 2013-Ohio-1095 (Ct. App. 2013).
Head, 28 N.E.3d at 129.
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section 2745.01(B). 152
Reilly Painting knew that injuries were
substantially certain to occur if Head fell from the roof without wearing
a safety harness, however, this knowledge did not demonstrate that
Reilly Painting deliberately intended to harm Head. 153 In other words,
the deliberate decision not to use safety equipment does not demonstrate
the requisite specific intent to injure. 154 The Eighth District concluded
that ruling the other way would revert the system back to the old
employer-intentional-tort standard, completely disregarding both the
legislature’s intent to constrict the cause of action and the Kaminski
decision. 155
The concurrence held that, while the judgment was correct, the
court’s reasoning contained flaws. 156 The concurrence noted that
circumstances exist in which a conscious decision to violate OSHA
regulations would be enough to withstand summary judgment because
reasonable minds could differ as to whether the employer acted with the
deliberate intent to injure. 157 OSHA requires safety equipment for
certain situations because injuries commonly occur and to completely
disregard the violations would be unwise. 158 The concurrence rejected
the majority’s decision to avoid using the Ninth District case. 159 That
case involved a dangerous excavation project in which an employer was
injured because a trench was not properly sloped. 160 However, due to
previous OSHA citations concerning similar excavations, the court
denied summary judgment because reasonable minds could conclude
that the employer was substantially certain that the employee would be
injured. 161 The Head concurrence suggested that facts similar to the
Ninth District case showing an employer’s blatant disregard for safety
with the knowledge that injuries were substantially certain to occur

152. See id.; see also Harris v. Benjamin Steel Co., No. 2012-Ohio-1499 (Ct. App. 2015) (holding
that OSHA violations alone do not demonstrate intent to injure); Vermett v. Fred Christen and Sons Co.,
741 N.E.2d 954 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (refusing to use an OSHA violation when considering if the
employer was substantially certain that an injury would occur).
153. Head, 28 N.E.3d at 130.
154. See id.
155. See id. The Kaminski court held that sections 34 and 35 of article II affirmatively grant the
General Assembly authority to enact legislation. Kaminski, 927 N.E.2d at 1088. The General Assembly
did not simply reenact the same statute that had been struck down in the past. Id. Therefore, section
2745.01 was constitutional. Id.
156. See id. at 132 (Gallagher, P.J., concurring).
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 132–33.
160. Head, 28 N.E.3d at 132–33; see Smith v. Ray Esser & Sons Inc., 2013-Ohio-1095 (Ct. App.
2013).
161. Head, 28 N.E.3d at 132–33.
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meets the requirement of section 2745.01(B). 162 This is important
because it supports the conclusion that section 2745.01(B) can, and
should be, read as providing employees with the option of using
substantial certainty to prove an employer intentional tort. When a set
of facts shows complete disregard for employee safety, the employer
should not be able to escape liability just because there is no evidence
that the employer acted with deliberate intent.
D. Eliminating the Substantial Certainty Prong Incentivizes Employers
to Cut Corners in Regards to Employer Safety
In Houdek, the Eighth District came to a logical conclusion that
section 2745.01(B) was a scrivener’s error. The provision is redundant
because “intent to injure” and “deliberate intent to injure” are essentially
the same requirement. While the General Assembly’s intent was to
restrict the cause of action for employees by eliminating the substantial
certainty prong, this language makes section 2745.01 confusing and
circular. Additionally, using an objective standard to determine if the
employer committed an intentional tort promotes a safe work
environment 163 and holds employers accountable for their conduct.164
Requiring an employer to live up to a reasonable, prudent-employer
standard will force the employer to eradicate those practices that are
substantially certain to injure an employee. 165 Applying a subjective
standard, as the Supreme Court of Ohio did before Kaminski [whatever
case changed the standard], is equivalent to bestowing upon employers
the old common law defenses they enjoyed before the Workers’
Compensation Act. Employers can effortlessly escape liability because
proving they acted with the intent or deliberate intent to injure is nearly
impossible. 166 Justice Pfeifer correctly noted that, after Houdek, the
employee must helplessly rely on the employer confessing that it
intended to injure. 167 Anything less than such an admission will be
insufficient to establish a case for intentional tort as the court effectively
eliminated drawing inferences in order to presume that the employer
acted with the requisite intent.
Additionally, the Houdek opinion directly conflicts with the purpose
162. Id. at 133. The circumstances surrounding the injury are imperative to showing deliberate
intent and should not be overlooked.
163. See Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1991) (“The substantial certainty standard
satisfies the Act’s purposes of providing trade-offs to competing interests and balancing these interests,
while serving as a deterrent to intentional wrongdoing and promoting safety in the workplace.”).
164. See Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., 2011-Ohio-1694, ¶ 45 (Ct. App. 2011).
165. Id.
166. See SAUTTER, supra note 71.
167. Houdek v. Thyssenkrupp Materials N.A., 983 N.E.2d 1253, 1260 (Pfeifer, dissenting).
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of enacting the workers’ compensation fund. The goal of the workers’
compensation fund was to promote a safe and injury-free work
environment, but abolishing the substantial certainty prong of an
intentional tort undermines this goal. 168 This actually incentivizes
cutting corners with regards to employee safety in order to maximize
profits. Connecticut provides an illustration of this problem because it
uses the substantial certainty analysis when determining an employer
intentional tort. 169 The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that
eliminating the substantial certainty prong would allow employers to
cost out an investment decision to kill workers and merely suffer a
premium increase. 170 Think of an automobile factory in which the
employer is trying to maximize profits any way possible. The employer
speeds up the production line, has fewer employees per shift, fails to
provide any safety gear, and refuses to repair any of the machines in the
factory. The employer knows that an injury is substantially certain to
occur by cutting all of these corners. However, under Houdek, an
injured employee’s sole remedy would be workers’ compensation
because the employer did not act with the deliberate intent to injure.171
Unless the employer acts with the deliberate intent to injure, Ohio courts
will view scenarios such as this as a “tragic accident” despite all of the
circumstances surrounding the injury. 172 The only threat to the
employer is the possibility of an increased experience rating, resulting in
a minimal increase in their premium. 173 One would be hard-pressed to
view this as “promoting employer safety.” Rather, the General
Assembly enacted section 2745.01 to permit employers to chase after
the almighty dollar even if that means eliminating employer safety.
Ohio enacted the workers’ compensation fund as a compromise
between the employee and employer, but eliminating recovery for
substantially certain intentional torts makes this “compromise” far too
one-sided. 174 Reverting back to the Jones standard would even out the
playing field and provide a safer environment for employees.
Additionally, Justice Pfeifer’s recognition that all of Ohio’s employers

168. Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982).
169. See Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 698 A.2d 838 (Conn. 1997); Woodson v. Rowland,
407 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1991).
170. See Suarez, 698 A.2d 838.
171. See Houdek, 983 N.E.2d at 1258.
172. See id. at 1259.
173. See FULTON, supra note 1, § 14.1.
174. See id. § 1.2.; see also SAUTTER, supra note 71. The Kaminski and Stetter decisions are
significant because they strengthen the exclusivity feature of the workers’ compensation system since
proving that an employer acted with deliberate intent to injure the employee is an extremely high burden
to meet.
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bear the consequences of Houdek should not go unnoticed.175
Undoubtedly, the majority of employers in Ohio conduct their business
in a manner that puts employee safety as a top priority. Despite these
employers’ commitment to safety, they will still have to pay for the
egregious conduct of the outliers who cut corners with safety because
compensation is paid out from the mandatory state fund. 176 Abolishing
the substantial certainty standard incentivizes employers who vow to
maintain a safe work environment to divorce themselves from those
practices because spending money on safety precautions—while their
competitors cut corners and maximize profits—is economically
unfeasible.
E. Courts Should Be Permitted to Infer from the Circumstances that an
Employer Committed an Intentional Tort
The majority opinion in Head demonstrates how far the courts have
distanced themselves from the old substantial certainty standard. OSHA
compiles rules and regulations that employers must comply with
because evidence suggests that injuries will occur without these
precautions. 177 However, if an employer disregards these rules the
courts still refuse to infer intent to injure regardless of the surrounding
circumstances. 178 The concurring opinion in Head mirrors Justice
Pfeifer’s dissent in Houdek and is a much better standard for courts to
follow. If OSHA cites an employer for past OSHA violations in which
employees were injured and still deliberately disregards safety
measures, the employer should not be immune from civil liability. 179
Deliberately ignoring past safety violations allows a reasonable person
to infer that the employer acted with the intent to injure. 180
Furthermore, a bright line rule that OSHA violations will never be
probative of intent to injure loads the dice even further in the favor of
the employer. 181 When an OSHA violation results in an injured
employee, courts should refrain from dismissing the case completely
and instead evaluate the facts and circumstances surrounding the
injury. 182 If the substantial certainty standard were to be completely
175. See Houdek, 983 N.E.2d at 1261 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
176. See FULTON, supra note 1, § 14.1.
177. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
178. Head v. Reilly Painting & Contracting, Inc., 28 N.E.3d 126, 130 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015); see
also Harris v. Benjamin Steel Co., No. 2012-Ohio-1499 (Ct. App. 2015).
179. See Head, 28 N.E.3d at 133 (Gallagher, P.J., concurring).
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. See Medina v. Harold J. Becker Co., 840 N.E.2d 1112 (Ohio App. 1st 2005). OSHA
violations can bolster the assertion of an intentional tort. Id.
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abolished from employer intentional torts, then the employee would at
least receive a “totality of the circumstances” analysis. In this analysis,
OSHA violations should be a significant factor in order to force
employers to maintain a safe work environment.
IV. THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION: SECTION 2745.01(C)
This part discusses employees’ last hope at recovery for an employer
intentional tort: section 2745.01(C). 183 Subsection (C) provides a
rebuttable presumption that the employer acted with intent to injure if
the employer removed an equipment safety guard. 184 However, this
presumption is not helpful because of how narrowly the courts have
interpreted it. 185 The Supreme Court of Ohio has had opportunities to
provide employees some protection in the workplace, but instead
squandered the opportunities by strictly interpreting this provision.
What is even more surprising than the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
decision is how lower courts have allowed employers to escape liability
when they are substantially certain that an injury will not occur.
Moreover, like subsection (B), subsection (C) provides little to no help
to employees and actually incentivizes employers to put employee
safety on the back burner.
A. The Stringent Interpretation of Section 2745.01(C): Hewitt v. L.E.
Myers Co.
In Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co., Larry Hewitt worked as an apprentice
lineman for L.E. Myers Company. 186 Hewitt was assigned to replace an
old electrical power line, which required tying in a new power line that
was de-energized. 187 L.E. Myers mandated that all linemen wear rubber
gloves when working regardless of whether the line was energized.188
However, Hewitt’s supervisor said that Hewitt did not need the
protective rubber gloves because the power line was de-energized.189
Hewitt was suspended in a bucket working on the line when someone
183. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(C) (LexisNexis 2016).
184. Id. Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard or deliberate
misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance creates a rebuttable presumption that the removal or
misrepresentation was committed with intent to injure another if an injury or an occupational disease or
condition occurs as a direct result.
185. See Jamie LaPlante, Ohio Supreme Court Limits Scope of Employer Intentional Tort Statute,
HR LAWS: OHIO EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER (Jan. 1, 2013), http://fmla.hrlaws.com/node/1218457.
186. Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co., 981 N.E.2d 795, 800 (Ohio 2012).
187. Id. at 797.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 797–98.
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yelled at him from the ground. 190 As he turned to respond, the wire he
was working on came in contact with an energized line, resulting in
severe burns. 191 Subsequently, Hewitt filed suit alleging an intentional
tort because L.E. Myers knew with substantial certainty that injury
would occur when working near an energized high voltage line without
wearing protective gloves. 192
The trial court held that rubber gloves were an equipment safety
guard under subsection (C) and L.E. Myers failed to rebut the
presumption. 193 However, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the
rubber gloves were not an equipment safety guard. 194 The court
interpreted the phrase “deliberate removal by an employer of an
equipment safety guard,” by reading the words according to the rules of
grammar and looking at the legislative intent. 195 Since the adjectives
“equipment” and “safety” modify the word “guard,” the court held that
an equipment safety guard means a protective device on an implement
or apparatus to make it safe and to prevent injury. 196 Essentially, an
equipment safety guard is a device designed to shield the operator from
exposure to a dangerous aspect of the equipment. 197
The lower court determined that a safety guard did not have to be
attached to machinery and Hewitt argued for a broad interpretation to
include any safety related item that may act as a barrier to an injury. 198
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected this interpretation and
reasoned that “equipment safety guard” does not include any generic
safety-related item. 199 The General Assembly intended to restrict
intentional tort liability, so to read subsection (C) as applying to any
safety equipment would be inconsistent. 200 Therefore, the rubber gloves
that Hewitt’s employer deemed unnecessary failed to meet the
requirements of equipment safety guard. 201 Rather, the rubber gloves
were merely freestanding items that served as a barrier between the
employee and a potential injury. 202 Freestanding items are personal
protective items that the employee controls, as opposed to an equipment
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 798.
Id.
Hewitt, 981 N.E.2d at 798.
See LAPLANTE, supra note 185.
See Hewitt, 981 N.E2d at 802.
Id. at 799.
Id.
See LaPlante, supra note 185.
See Hewitt, 981 N.E2d at 800.
Id. at 800–801.
Id. at 801.
See id.
Id.
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safety guard. 203
Justice Pfeifer dissented and held that the majority read into the
statute, “deliberate removal by an employer of a safety guard attached
to equipment.” 204 The General Assembly did not enact the statute with
those words, but that is how the majority interpreted it. 205 Rather than
adding words or trying to decipher the General Assembly’s intent, the
better method of interpretation is to read the statute as enacted. 206 When
reading the phrase “equipment safety guard” as a unitary term, there is a
simple meaning—equipment that is used as a safety guard.207
Consequently, helmets, facemasks, visors and other similar items are
equipment used as a safety guard, but their removal will no longer give
rise to the presumption. 208 The majority opinion is “staggering” and
“dangerous” for employees because subsection (C) was interpreted so
narrowly. 209 This restrictive interpretation will be devastating because
employers have less incentive to maintain a safe work environment.210
B. Substantial Certainty: The Double Standard
As previously discussed, knowledge with substantial certainty that an
injury will occur because of OSHA violations is not enough to recover
for an employer intentional tort; however, substantial certainty that an
injury will not occur is enough to rebut the presumption of subsection
(C), as seen in Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co. 211 In that case, Norman
Rudisill began working at Ford in 1994 and worked his way up to a
team leader. 212 He was in charge of a mold line where engines were
cast in molten metal. 213 In the mold line process, the engine is placed in
a mold and molten iron is poured into the mold, which hardens into the
engine. 214 Sometimes molten metal runs over and down the side of the
mold requiring an employee to rake off the molten metal into a pit

203. Id. at 801.
204. Hewitt, 981 N.E2d at 802 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 803.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. Affirming the lower court would have no seriously negative impact on employers. Id.
They need only pay some money to the injured employee but employers are more readily equipped to
suffer this burden. Id. However, reversing the lower court will have disastrous long term consequences
for employees. Id.
210. Hewitt, 981 N.E2d at 803.
211. See Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co., 709 F.3d 595, 607 (6th Cir. 2013).
212. Id. at 598.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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below. 215 A crane and hoist must clamp the mold and suspend it over
the open pit. 216 In order to do this, guardrails must be removed, leaving
the pit exposed. 217 Rudisill completed this process hundreds of times.218
On the day of the injury, Rudisill was in the process of raking the
molten metal off the mold. 219 As he raked the mold, it became
unbalanced, causing a clamp to slip off and hit Rudisill in the face.220
As a result, Rudisill stumbled back and fell down into the pit leaving
him with a head injury and severe burns. 221 Rudisill filed suit for
employer intentional tort under 2745.01(C). 222
The district court held that the presumption of intent to injure under
subsection (C) was successfully established, but determined that Ford
had rebutted the presumption. 223 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
and further discussed how Ford rebutted the presumption of intent to
injure. 224 First, in the hundreds of thousands of hours worked at the
plant, no substantially similar accident occurred. 225 Additionally, Ford
had no previous citations or complaints about the mold line process.226
Rudisill engaged in the process hundreds of times and claimed that he
would have said something to management had he believed it was a
dangerous process. 227
By presenting all of this information, Ford did not merely rely on an
affidavit stating, “We love safety” to rebut the presumption. 228 Rather,
Ford presented hard, uncontroverted evidence that enabled the court to
determine that Ford adequately rebutted the presumption. 229 Rudisill
attempted to present evidence that OSAH had cited Ford for violations
for having exposed floor openings covered and guarded. 230 However,
the court rejected this argument, holding that OSHA violations cannot
permit a reasonable jury to find that Ford acted with the intent to injure
215. Id. at 599.
216. Id.
217. Rudisill, 709 F.3d at 599.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 600.
223. Rudisill, 709 F.3d at 604.
224. Id. at 608.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 599.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 608.
229. Rudisill, 709 F.3d at 608; see also Downard v. Rumpke of Ohio, Inc., 3 N.E.3d 1270 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2013) (stating that the holding in Rudisill comports with the case law from the Supreme Court
of Ohio).
230. See Rudisill, 709 F.3d at 611.
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Rudisill. 231
C. The Final Nail in the Employer Intentional Tort Coffin: Cincinnati
Insurance Co. v. DTJ Enterprises (In re Hoyle)
In the most recent decision concerning section 2745.01, the Supreme
Court of Ohio officially ended the possibility for recovery under the
substantial certainty standard. 232 In Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. DTJ
Enterprises (In re Hoyle), Duane Allen Hoyle suffered serious injuries
when he fell fourteen feet from an unstable ladder jack while working
for his employers DTJ Enterprises and Cavanaugh. 233 Hoyle alleged
that his supervisor refused to use bolts that would keep the ladder jack
stable because they took too long to use. 234 Cincinnati Insurance
Company (CIC) intervened in the case, claiming it had no obligation to
indemnify DTJ or Cavanaugh should Hoyle prevail. 235
The CIC insurance policy offered extended coverage for an additional
premium for an act that is substantially certain to cause bodily injury. 236
This additional policy covered substantially certain intentional torts, but
excluded acts with the deliberate intent to injure. 237 Importantly, the
coverage acknowledged section 2745.01 and noted that the substantial
certainty policy will be offered only until the Supreme Court of Ohio
decided the constitutionality. 238 Upon the Kaminski decision, CIC no
longer offered the substantial certainty coverage. 239
Hoyle argued that subsection (C) does not involve the deliberate
intent to injure and, therefore, the insurance coverage should not be
excluded.240 The Ninth District held, “[D]eliberate intent to injure may
be presumed for the purposes of the statute where there is a deliberate
removal of a safety guard, this does not in itself amount to deliberate
intent for the purposes of the insurance exclusion.” 241 This means that
an employee may prevail on an intentional tort claim without actually

231. See id.; see also Schiemann v. Foti Contracting, 2013-Ohio-269 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013);
Hernandez v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 1215 (Ohio 1995).
232. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. DTJ Enters. (In re Hoyle), 36 N.E.3d 122 (Ohio 2014).
233. Id. at 125.
234. Id.
235. See David J. Oberly, Ohio Precludes Insurance Coverage for Employer Intentional Torts,
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT, July 2015, at 6.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Hoyle, 36 N.E.3d at 129.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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proving deliberate intent to injure. 242 However, the Supreme Court of
Ohio reversed because the whole point of the presumption is to presume
the intent required under subsections (A) and (B). 243 Therefore, CIC
does not have to indemnify, regardless of the outcome of the case.
Ultimately, this holding solidifies that the employee may not recover
unless the employee proves deliberate intent to injure.
D. Missed Opportunity to Reestablish Employee Protection
The opportunity to give some protection to Ohio employees
presented itself to the court in Hewitt, but the court failed to take
advantage as it once again ruled in favor of employers. 244 The General
Assembly did not define what equipment safety guard meant, leaving
the court with the responsibility to decide. 245 Unfortunately, the court
interpreted this provision so narrowly that it is essentially useless
because it is so difficult to prove. 246 The only conceivable situation in
which subsection (C) would come into play would be in a factory job
where machines are prevalent, leaving many of Ohio’s employees at
risk. 247 The appellate court even noted that a stringent interpretation
would severely limit recovery to only those employees who use
machines. 248 However, the Supreme Court of Ohio interpreted the
provision narrowly solely because the General Assembly’s intent was to
restrict liability for intentional torts. 249 Ruling that rubber gloves that
protect linemen from potentially deadly power lines are not an
equipment safety guard created a precedent that is staggering and
dangerous for employees. Now employers are free to disregard this and
similar equipment without fearing liability.
E. Incongruent Standards for Proving and Rebutting an Employer
Intentional Tort
The Rudisill court deemed that OSHA violations are insufficient in
order to prove an intentional tort under 2745.01(C). 250 OSHA violations
offer evidence that an injury is substantially certain to occur if
242. See Oberly, supra note 235.
243. See Hoyle, 36 N.E.3d at 130–31.
244. See Kerns & Glumac, supra note 11.
245. Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co., 981 N.E.2d 795, 800 (Ohio 2012).
246. See JAMES T. O'REILLY & THERESA NELSON RUCK , OHIO PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE
§ 7:28 (2015).
247. See Kerns & Glumac, supra note 11.
248. See Hewitt, 981 N.E.2d at 800.
249. See id. at 800–801.
250. See Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co., 709 F.3d 595, 607 (6th Cir. 2013).
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employers do not take certain precautions, yet this will not suffice to
prove intent to injure on behalf of the employer. Astonishingly, the
court then affirmed that Ford had rebutted its presumption because no
similar accidents had occurred in the hundreds of thousands of hours
worked in the factory. 251 Moreover, the court allowed evidence to show
that the employer was substantially certain that injury would not occur
to rebut the presumption under subsection (C). However, the court did
not allow OSHA violations showing that injuries were substantially
certain to occur to establish that Ford acted with the intent to injure.
This is inherently contradictory and demonstrates just how far courts are
willing to go in order to protect employers. This standard is untenable
and the court even noted, “One might argue as a matter of policy that his
bargain is too one-sided; that the employees got the short end of the
stick.” 252 However, this is a matter to take up with the General
Assembly, not the courts. 253 As in Cain, this once again acknowledges
lower courts’ unwillingness to apply the harsh standard of section
2745.01.
F. The Final Nail in the Employer Intentional Tort Coffin
Hoyle is not a surprising decision, and the court correctly decided this
based on the precedent of current section 2745.01. However, this
decision completely closes off any potential of substantial certainty
squeaking into the section 2745.01 analysis. 254 Justice O’Neill’s dissent
hit the nail squarely on the head when he stated, “The case before us
demonstrates the money-driven efforts to return once again to the preBlankenship days, when profits were never placed in peril by the
egregious acts of management.” 255
This gradual extinction of
employees’ cause of action for an employer intentional tort serves no
one. 256 As Justice Lanzinger noted, the outcome of this decision is that
nothing less than deliberate intent will prevail. 257 Furthermore, the
effect of this decision is that employees will be limited to only workers’
compensation for any injury sustained at work whether or not it is from
intentional conduct of the employer. 258
251. Id.
252. Id. at 612.
253. Id.
254. See Oberly, supra note 235; see also KEVIN M. YOUNG, KARL A. BEKENY & JENNIFER L.
MESKO, OHIO INSURANCE COVERAGE § 4:12 (2016).
255. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. DTJ Enters. (In re Hoyle), 36 N.E.3d 122, 133 (Ohio 2014) (O’Neill,
J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 134.
257. Id. at 133 (Lanzinger, J., concurring).
258. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Spectators forecasted that the employer intentional tort was in peril
when the Supreme Court of Ohio held that section 2745.01 is
constitutional. 259 However, after seeing just how strictly the court has
applied the statute since Kaminski, no question remains as to whether or
not it is extinct. Once the court decided Kaminski, a reasonable observer
would certainly question the longevity of subsection (B). However, it
was unthinkable that subsection (C), the only employee friendly portion
of the statute, would also be interpreted so narrowly. As Justice Pfeifer
noted, at this point in the history of section 2745.01, it is impossible to
think of a situation in which an employee would prevail unless the
employer confesses that they acted with intent to injure. 260 This permits
the employer to cut corners and take unnecessary risks, jeopardizing
employee safety while facing only minimal consequences of a premium
increase. Employers receive a mere slap on the wrist for their egregious
conduct while employees bear the burden of not being fully
compensated. The so-called “compromise” of workers’ compensation is
far too one-sided if employers are cloaked from liability for intentional
torts.
Ideally, the best approach would be reverting back to the Jones and
Restatement Second standard. Allowing the employee to recover when
the employer was substantially certain that their conduct would result in
an injury incentivizes employers to maintain a safe and accident free
work environment. The purpose of establishing workers’ compensation
was to promote safety, so it is unimaginable to eliminate substantial
certainty from the intentional tort analysis. A secondary, but still
effective, approach would be to implement a “totality of the
circumstances” analysis. If deliberate intent is required then courts
should at least be able to make inferences, since deliberate intent is such
a high threshold. While this is not a perfect solution, it makes recovery
actually possible.
In sum, the only thing substantially certain about the current state of
section 2745.01 is that plaintiff’s attorneys will go nowhere near one of
these cases despite the validity of the claim.

259. See generally Mahboob, supra note 10.
260. Houdek v. Thyssenkrupp Materials N.A., 983 N.E.2d 1253, 1260 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
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